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D.C. CONSUMER PROTECTION
PROCEDURES ACT
"Consumer protection affects everyone. It is particularly vital
to the future of our cities, because the chief victims of cheating of
consumers are the disadvantaged in our inner cities."'
Recognizing the need for a comprehensive consumer protection agency
with extensive jurisdiction and enforcement powers,2 the Council of the
District of Columbia in 19763 enacted the District of Columbia Consumer
Protection Procedures Act (CPPA).4 Substantively, the Act is unusually
comprehensive because it prohibits twenty-four specific unfair trade prac-
tices.5 In contrast, only fifteen of the forty-nine state consumer protection
statutes enumerate prohibited trade practices, and none contain as many
prohibitions as the District of Columbia statute.6 The majority of the forty-
1. THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORTS OF COMMIT-
TEES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR CONCERNED WITH FEDERAL LEGISLATION, THE
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ASSISTANCE, CONSUMER PROTECTION 45 (1969).
2. As Chairperson of the Committee on Public Services and Consumer Affairs,
Councilmember John A. Wilson's top priority was the establishment of a vibrant consumer
protection agency. Simon, Guide to the D.C. Consumer Protection Act, 2 DISTRICT LAW. 43
(1977).
3. The CPPA was introduced on September 23, 1975. 22 D.C. Reg. 1635 (Sept. 25, 1975).
Hearings were held and the Council voted unanimously on January 13, 1976 to approve the
bill. Interviews with Victor Simon, Esq., District of Columbia Office of Consumer Protec-
tion, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 1976-Jan., 1977) (Mr. Simon was Legislative Assistant to
Councilmember Wilson and the Council's Committee on Public Services and Consumer
Affairs during the drafting, committee review, and passage of the CPPA). Mayor Walter E.
Washington vetoed that bill on Feb. 10 because he objected to the requirement that the
agency director, general counsel, and administrative law judge be District residents subject
to Council approval. Committee on Public Services and Consumer Affairs, Committee Re-
port on Bill 1-253, the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, 27 (Mar.
24, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Report on Bill 1-253]. Member Wilson introduced a modified
bill, 1-253, on March 4, 22 D.C. Reg. 4801 (Mar. 10, 1976), and it was unanimously passed
on April 10. Interviews with Victor Simon, supra. The Mayor signed this bill and it became
law on July 22, 1976. Simon, supra note 2, at 43.
The Office of Consumer Protection established by the CPPA evolved from dissatisfaction
with the weak mandate and limited authority of the predecessor Office of Consumer Affairs.
See Report on Bill 1-253, supra, at 4. In practice, the emphasis of that Office was not on
forceful consumer advocacy but rather on consumer education and the promotion of an
amicable environment for merchant and consumer. Id. at 5.
4. D.C. Law 1-76; 1976 D.C. Code Legis. & Admin. Serv. 87, reprinted in D.C. Code tit.
28, app. (Supp. IV 1977) (hereinafter cited as CPPA].
5. Id. § 5; See notes 15-19 & accompanying text infra.
6. Fifteen states have enacted statutes which enumerate deceptive practices. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 6-1-105 (1973); GA. CODE § 106-1203 (Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE § 48-603 (1977);
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nine contain no such enumerations. 7 Procedurally, the Act is unique in
several respects. It establishes the only state-level consumer protection
agency mandated to accept, investigate, and evaluate individual consumer
complaints. 8 In addition, it provides for a free public prosecutor, 9 and ad-
ministrative adjudications resulting in final and binding remedies, includ-
ing damages, restitution, and cease and desist orders.' 0 Like many
consumer protection statutes, the Act expressly provides for a private right
of action without requiring that consumers first exhaust administrative
remedies. " Significantly, the scope of such private actions is not limited to
enforcement of the twenty-four specific substantive prohibitions. Not only
does the Act empower the agency to enforce some sixty-five preexisting
consumer statutes addressing varying aspects of consumer protection, but
these statutes also may be privately enforced under the Act.'
2
Although unusually strong in these respects, the Act has significant
weaknesses and ambiguities. Moreover, the limited resources devoted to
enforcement by the District of Columbia effectively dilute the Act's
strength. This Note will assess the Act's substantive provisions and admin-
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-3 (Bums 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-3 (Supp. 1977); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 598.410 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A: 2 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 15, § 753 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 646.608 (1972); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
201-2(4) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-1(e) (Supp. 1975); S.D. COM-
PILED LAWS ANN. § 37-24-6 (1972); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.46(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1977-1978); VA. CODE § 59.1-200 (Supp. 1977); Wvo. STAT. § 40-106(a) (Supp. 1975).
See also Federal Trade Commission, Fact Sheet: State Legislation to Combat Unfair Trade
Practices (Sept. 8, 1977) (available from Gale P. Gotschall, Deputy Director of Federal-State
and Consumer Relations, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C. 20580) [hereinafter
cited as Fact Sheet]. Alabama, which has no such statute, maintains a clearinghouse to facil-
itate consumer protection actions under existing state law and to recommend new legisla-
tion. ALA. CODE tit. 5, § 19-2 (1975).
7. Some states have adopted the broad language of § 5(a) of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act which proscribes "unfair methods of competition ... and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce ... ." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976). Fact Sheet, supra
note 6, at 1; see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-
1.1(a) (Supp. 1977).
Some other states have adopted similarly broad prohibitions reaching all forms of fraudu-
lent, deceptive, and sometimes unfair acts and practices in trade or commerce. Fact Sheet,
supra note 6, at 1; see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-904, 70-906 (Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit.
6, § 2513 (1974).
8. Interviews with Gale P. Gotschall, Counsel for Federal-State Cooperation, Federal
Trade Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Nov., 1976-Mar., 1977); Interviews with Victor
Simon, supra note 3.
9. CPPA § 6(b).
10. Id. § 4(13).
I1. Id. § 6(k)(1). Eight states do not provide for a private right of action. See Fact Sheet,
supra note 6, at 2.
12. CPPA § 6(k)(1).
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istrative scheme, with an emphasis on procedural issues and the impact of
the choice of law jurisprudence of the District of Columbia.
I. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
The CPPA expressly proscribes twenty-four specific trade practices.' 3
Several of the prohibitions appear to be derived from the 1973 Suggested
State Provisions for the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act which was
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and approved by the American Bar Association.' 4 Except for broad
proscriptions against misrepresentations concerning the quality, composi-
tion, service, condition, and price of goods and services, these prohibitions
defy categorization and do not appear to reflect a systematic analysis of
consumer protection issues. The list reads like a disjointed catalogue of
unfair trade practices, drawing its strength from the sheer number of prac-
tices prohibited. Thus, for example, the statute prohibits advertising of
goods in inadequate supply or without intent to sell, 15 false statements
concerning the need for repair or replacement, 16 harassment of consum-
ers, 17 and disparagement of competing products or services. 18 The Act af-
firmatively requires sellers to supply consumers with copies of documents
pertinent to the consumer transaction involved, such as a lease, service
contract, promissory note, or trust agreement. 19
Although the list of unfair practices is long, and some provisions seem
broad, it does not include a catchall prohibition of unfair or deceptive
practices.20 Thus, a consumer who is unable to fashion a complaint based
13. Id. § 5.
14. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT, reprinted in 7 U.L.A. 306 (1977).
15. CPPA § 5(h).
16. Id § 5(k).
17. Id § 5(m).
18. Id § 5(g).
19. Id § 5(q).
20. One commentator has called for an amendment to provide such a general prohibi-
tion. Unpublished remarks of Joel P. Bennett, Esq., member District of Columbia Bar Com-
mittee on Consumer Law, before the District of Columbia Bar Association Seminar on
Consumer Affairs (Oct. 3, 1976).
An example of a broad, flexible proscription for undesirable commercial conduct and
practices may be found in the federal securities laws. Section 10(b)(5) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), makes it unlawful:
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
This section has traditionally been regarded as a catchall to protect against particular
devices not anticipated by the legislators. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F. 2d 833,
859 (2d Cir. 1968). The Securities Act of 1933, which requires registration with the SEC of
[Vol. 27:642
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on one of the twenty-four proscribed merchant activities may be con-
fronted with obstacles arising from statutory interpretation. 2' Although
not reflected in the public legislative history, it was the intent of the Act's
draftsman not to "include a catchall prohibitory provision. 22 The draftsman
reasoned that enforcement of the twenty-four specific provisions would be
enough of a challenge for the fledgling agency and that amendments
broadening the substantive scope of the Act would be better delayed until
the agency became solidly established. In addition, a comprehensive list of
twenty-four prohibited practices would give the agency far more direction
in its infancy than would a general catchall prohibition, the interpretation
of which would be open to question.23 In the absence of a general prohibi-
tory provision, a clever merchant may circumvent the Act by devising an
innovative scheme not now contemplated by the Act.
Of the enumerated trade practices, the broadest is the proscription of
unconscionable contracts. 24 Although most statutes dealing with uncon-
scionability do not define the term, the CPPA identifies several elements to
most public, interstate offerings of securities, also has a catchall provision dealing with inter-
state offers and sales of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (1976).
21. The statutory interpretation obstacles are either the rule of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, or a claim that omission of a catchall prohibition must be treated as a deliberate
legislative act. Regarding the expressio unius rule, Professor Sutherland has stated that since
administrative agencies are statutorily established without inherent or common law powers,
the general rule applied to enabling statutes is that the only powers granted are those which
are expressed or necessarily implied. 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 65.02
(4th ed. 1974).
Dean Ezra Thayer has suggested that an omission must be regarded as deliberate:
[O]mission . . . must . . . be treated as the deliberate choice of the legislature,
and the court has no right to disregard it . . . . The true attitude of the courts,
therefore, is to ascertain the legislature's expressed intent (except in so far as that
inquiry is necessary in order to give effect to what is expressed), and then to con-
sider the resulting situtation in the light of the common law.
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 320 (1913) (emphasis ad-
ded)
22. Interview with Victor Simon, Esq., D.C. Office of Consumer Protection, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Nov. 15, 1977) (for Mr. Simon's background, see note 3 supra).
23. Id.
24. CPPA § 5(r) lists several factors to be considered in determining whether a contract
provision is unconscionable:
(I) knowledge by the person at the time credit sales are consummated that there
was no reasonable probability of payment in full of the obligation by the con-
sumer,
(2) knowledge by the person at the time of the sale or lease of the inability of
the consumer to receive substantial benefits from the property or services sold or
leased,
(3) gross disparity between the price of the property or services sold or leased
and the value of the property or services measured by the price at which similar
property or services are readily obtainable in transactions by like buyers or lessees;
(4) that the person contracted for or received separate charges for insurance
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be considered. These elements, apparently borrowed from the Uniform
Consumer Sales Practices Act 25 and the Uniform Commercial Credit
Code,26 include the sophistication of the consumer, the price of the goods,
and the seller's knowledge of whether the consumer will receive substan-
tial benefits from the contract. The District of Columbia definition is more
extensive than the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, since the Dis-
trict of Columbia Act mandates consideration of the potential unconscion-
ability of separate charges for life insurance with respect to credit sales.
27
II. ADMINISTRATIVE SCHEME
The Act creates the Office of Consumer Protection 28 to enforce the enu-
merated prohibitions against unfair trade practices. The office is empow-
ered to receive and investigate complaints and to initiate its own
investigations. 29 To facilitate investigations, the Office may conduct hear-
ings, subpoena documents and witnesses, issue cease and desist orders and
consent decrees, and provide full remedies including restitution, repair, re-
placement, and damages in contract. 30 In addition, the Office administers
the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 31 the Consumer Retail Credit Regu-
lation,32 and the Consumer Goods Repair Regulation.33 The Office is spe-
cifically denied authority to award damages for tort claims; to deal with
utility, taxicab, security, or landlord-tenant cases; or to deal with cases in-
volving a government agency. Also beyond the scope of the Office's au-
with respect to credit sales with the effect of making the sales, considered as a
whole, unconscionable;
(5) that the person has knowingly taken advantage of the inability of the con-
sumer reasonably to protect his interests by reasons of age, physical or mental
infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the language of the
agreement, or similar factors.
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) has not defined unconscionability. The drafters
of the U.C.C. suggested, however that: "The basic test is whether, in the light of the general
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing
at the time of the making of the contract." U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
25. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT, reprinted in 7 U.L.A. 240 (1976).
26. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CREDIT CODE § 5.108(4).
27. CPPA § 5(r)(4), reprinted in note 24 supra.
28. Id § 3. The CPPA creates the positions of director, deputy director-chief of section of
investigations, general counsel, and administrative law judge.
29. Id. § 4 (a)(l).
30. Id. §§ 4(a)(l), (2), (3), (13).
31. Id § 4(b)(1)(A); District of Columbia Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1971, D.C.
Code §§ 28-3601 to 3817 (1973 & Supp. IV 1977).
32. CPPA § 4(b)(l)(B); District of Columbia Consumer Retail Credit Regulation, Regu-
lation 71-18, 17 D.C. Reg. 815 (June 11, 1971).
33. CPPA § 4(b)(1)(C); District of Columbia Consumer Goods Repair Regulation, Regu-
lation 74-3, 20 D.C. Reg. 897 (1974).
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thority are cases involving lawyer-client, doctor-patient, or clergy-laity
relationships.3 The Act does not apply to complaints against broadcasters
or publishers for false or illegal advertising. Moreover, unlike several state
statutes with similar provisions, the Act does not reach a publisher or
broadcaster who has a direct financial interest in goods or services other
than his own, nor does the Act expressly encompass the actions of the
agents or employees of broadcasters or publishers.
35
A consumer can trigger administrative action by filing with the Office a
complaint plainly describing the suspect trade practice. 36 To the extent this
suggests that only the filing of a complaint can begin the administrative
process, it appears to be inconsistent with the power of the director to initi-
ate an investigation,37 since the director cannot file a complaint. 38 This
apparent inconsistency can be resolved, however, by viewing the two statu-
tory provisions as alternative mechanisms for initiating an investigation.
In any event, the Act is potentially weakened because the director may
act only after a violation has occurred, and is not expressly authorized to
seek injunctive or other relief when there is reason to believe a person is
34. CPPA §§ 4(c)(l), 2(A)-2(E).
35. An exemption for acts performed by publishers and broadcasters when they do not
have knowledge of the false, misleading, or deceptive character of the advertisement is
found in the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (Truth in Lending Act), 15 U.S.C. §
1665 (1976). The consumer protection laws of Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington contain similar provisions.
See Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (revised for 1970) 3, reprinted in
XXIX COMMITTEE ON SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-
MENTS SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION (1969) [hereinafter cited as Law Revision].
36. A full and complete description is not required and the description should be con-
strued in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Report on Bill 1-253, supra
note 3, at 19. A complaint should not be dismissed for a failure to state a claim "unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). See
generally Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 Wyo. L.J. 177 (1958); McCaskill, The
Modern Philosophy of Pleading." A Dialogue Outside the Shades, 58 A.B.A.J. 123 (1952).
37. Compare CPPA § 6(a) which provides:
A case is begun by filing with the Office a complaint plainly describing a trade
practice and stating the complainant's (and, if different, the consumer's) name and
address, the name and address (if known) of the respondent, and such other infor-
mation as the Director may require. The complaint must be in writing or reduced
by the Director to writing.
with id § 4(a) which provides: "The Office may (1) receive and investigate complaints and
initiate its own investigation of deceptive, unfair, or unlawful trade practices against con-
sumers. .. "
38. Section 2(a)4 defines a complainant as:
one or more consumers who took part in a trade practice, or one or more
persons acting on behalf of (not the legal representative or other counsel of) such
consumers, or the successors or assigns of such consumers or persons, once such
consumers or persons complain to the Office about the trade practice.
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about to commit an unlawful trade practice. To avoid director impotence
in the face of incipient or contemplated prohibited schemes, the Act could
be amended by adding the words "about to execute" in the phrase which
authorizes the Office to "determine whether a person has executed a trade
practice" which is unlawful. 39 It should be noted, however, that such an
amendment may be subject to attack as a prior restraint on speech.
40
It has been suggested that the Act should be amended to empower the
Office, when making investigations, to inspect records during normal busi-
ness hours or after reasonable notice.4 ' Absent consent by the subject of
the investigation to the search of the business records, there is serious ques-
tion whether such searches by the Office's representatives would be subject
to the fourth amendment precondition of a search warrant. 42 The Supreme
Court has held that citizens have privacy interests in their business estab-
lishments similar to those they have in their homes. 43 Moreover, excep-
tions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement have been permitted
only in limited circumstances: when the ambit of the search was narrowly
focused, the affected industries were historically regulated, and the search
was related to a legislative purpose in regulating businesses engaged in an
inherently dangerous enterprise.44 Since the typical retail merchant does
39. Compare CPPA § 4(a)(13) with §§ 5, 10, Law-Revision, supra note 35, at 8, 10.
40. An effort to curtail commercial speech before it occurs is subject to constitutional
attack because any system of prior restraints of expression bears a heavy presumption of
constitutional invalidity. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
41. Unsigned letter from Mayor Walter E. Washington to Council Chairman Sterling
Tucker (undated) (drafted by Victor Simon, Esq., District of Columbia Office of Consumer
Protection).
42. In Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 46 U.S.L.W. 4483 (U.S. May 23, 1978), the Supreme Court
held that the fourth amendment protects commercial buildings as well as homes and there-
fore requires that Occupational Health and Safety Act inspectors secure a warrant or its
equivalent before inspecting a business for OSHA violations. However, probable cause for
the issuance of such a warrant is not as strict as that required by criminal law. A warrant
may issue upon a showing of a specific violation or upon a showing that reasonable adminis-
trative standards for conducting the search have been complied with. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4486.
See also Michigan v. Tyler, 46 U.S.L.W. 4533 (U.S. June 6, 1978) (describing fourth amend-
ment standards governing entries to burned buildings when investigating the causes of a
fire); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 46 U.S.L.W. 4546 (June 6, 1978) (upon probable cause,
warrants may be issued to search any property, for the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence
of a crime; should first amendment interests be endangered, however, warrant requirements
must be applied "with particular exactitude").
43. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967). See also Camera v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
44. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). See also Colonade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). These exceptions have been narrowly applied. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Terraciano v. Montayne, 493 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
875 (1974) (search of pharmacist's records of narcotics permitted); United States v. Del
Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972) (search for adulterated food
[Vol. 27:642
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not fall within these exceptions, the City Council should proceed cau-
tiously with any amendment of the statute which would purport to author-
ize the Office to perform warrantless administrative searches.
After the investigation is conducted, the director must determine
whether reasonable grounds exist to believe that an unfair trade practice
has occurred, and whether the practice has violated any other District of
Columbia statute, regulation, rule of common law, or other law. 45 If rea-
sonable grounds are lacking,46 the director may dismiss the complaint.
However, if he finds reasonable grounds, 47 the director must attempt to
settle the case; if the complainant refuses to participate in settlement dis-
cussions, the director may dismiss the complaint. 48 If a settlement is not
reached within forty-five days, the case may be referred to the administra-
tive law judge for decision. 49 A hearing must be held between thirty to
ninety days after a referral to the administrative law judge has been
made.50
In addition to administrative remedies, the CPPA also provides for an
permitted); Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973)
(search of historically regulated coal mines permitted). Moreover, the Court has been reluc-
tant to expand the exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338
(1977). But see Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
45. CPPA § 6(b)(2). The term "other law" is not defined in the Act, but conceivably may
include federal consumer protection statutes or the law of another state which may be con-
trolling in certain circumstances. See notes 62-63 & accompanying text infra.
Although the director's determination is to occur within 60 days after the filing of a com-
plaint, a close reading of the Act suggests that the director might not have to make a deter-
mination within 60 days if the asserted violation is premised upon other than District of
Columbia law, because "other law" determinations are omitted from the 60 day require-
ment. Section 6(d) provides in part: "within 60 days after the complaint is filed, the Director
shall determine that there are, or that there are not, reasonable grounds to believe that a
trade practice, in violation of the law of the District of Columbia within the jurisdiction of the
Office has occurred" (emphasis added). It is unlikely that this result was intended by the
draftsman, however, and it appears to have been an inadvertent omission.
46. Section 6(i)(1) of the Act provides, inter alia, that a complainant may appeal to the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals when the Director exercises his authority under §
6(d), (e), or (h)(2) to dismiss a complaint. The standard of judicial review specified in § II of
the D.C. Administrative Procedures Act is to govern such appeals. D.C. Code § 1-1510
(Supp. IV 1977). To the extent this portion of the statute may subject the director's determi-
nation to review, even if limited to the relatively narrow "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard, the statute reflects a more substantial encroachment upon prosecutorial discretion than
is enjoyed by other officials charged with analogous complaint evaluation responsibilities.
See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (d) (1970), construed in
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) (NLRB General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint
is unreviewable unless unconstitutional or plainly contrary to law).
47. CPPA § 6(d).
48. Id. §§ 6(e), (h)(2).
49. Id. § 6(e).
50. Id § 6(0.
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express private right of action for an aggrieved consumer,5' and permits
recovery of punitive52 and treble damages,
53 as well as attorney's fees. 54
These provisions were designed to encourage the private bar to represent
consumers.5 5 Further, it is noteworthy that class actions are not excluded
from the private right of action. Assuming that such actions are permissi-
ble, however, each class member must assert at least $750 in damages, and
the complex problems of class member determination and notice must
then be confronted.
56
There are two features of District of Columbia law, external to this Act
and complemented by the close proximity of the Maryland and Virginia
suburbs, which may work to increase its effectiveness and scope. First, the
extent of the Office's personal jurisdiction appears to be governed by the
District of Columbia "long-arm" statute,57 which subjects any person to
51. Id. § 6(k)(l). Such a provision is consistent with a recent trend in other jurisdictions
to provide a private right of action when a consumer is the subject of a deceptive trade
practice. Forty-three states currently have some provision for private rights of action by
consumers. Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 2. New York, for example, expressly confers exclu-
sive power on the Attorney General to bring an action. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(b) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1977). In Florida, a consumer seeking to bring a private right of action might
be required to post bond to indemnify the defendant for any damages incurred if the action
is challenged as frivolous, without legal or factual merit, or brought for purposes of harass-
ment. FLA. STAT. § 501.211(3) (Supp. 1977). In Georgia, a consumer must give the defend-
ant thirty days notice of intent to file a suit so as to encourage settlement. GA. CODE §
106.1210(b) (Supp. 1977).
52. The standard for an award of punitive damages is the "amount of actual damages,
frequency, persistence, and degree of intention of the merchant's unlawful trade practice and
the number of consumers adversely affected." Report on Bill 1-253 supra note 3, at 23.
53. Twelve states have some form of recovery of treble damages: ARK. STAT. ANN. §
45.50.531(a) (1975); HAW. REV. STAT § 480-13 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1409 (A) (Supp.
1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 85-408 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (Supp.
1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1975); 73 PA. CONS. STAT.§§ 201-9.2 (Purdon Supp. 1977);
S.C. CODE § 66-71.13(a) (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. ch. 438, § 10 (1977); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.50 (Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 246 1(b) (Supp. 1975); WASH.
REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (Supp.1976).
54. Although most states provide for the award of attorney's fees to the successful plain-
tiff, in Louisiana, if the Court determines that the action is groundless, an award of reason-
able attorney's fees must be made to the merchant. LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1409(A) (Supp.
1977).
55. Report on Bill 1-253, supra note 3, at 23.
56. D.C. Code § 10-2180 (Supp. IV 1977).
57. D.C. Code § 13-401 (1973). CPPA § 4(a)(l 1) enpowers the Office to implead and
interplead parties under § 6, and § 6(b)(3) provides that the director may refuse to issue a
complaint if the respondent would not be subject to the personal jurisdiction of a District of
Columbia court. The District of Columbia long-arm statute is based on the UNIFORM IN-
TERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT, reprinted in 13 U. L. A. 283 (1975). Stat-
utes based on this Act have been found constitutional. Eg., Bowsher v. Digby, 243 Ark.
799, 422 S.W.2d 671 (1968).
In addition, personal jurisdiction could be established under this section for property in-
terests, insurance relationships, or a tortious injury. This requirement is modeled on long
[Vol. 27:642
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the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts who regularly transacts
business or contracts to supply services in the District.58 Under the long
arm statute, minimal contacts are sufficient, provided they are strong and
continuous. 59 However, contacts solely with the federal government do not
trigger personal jurisdiction. o This exception recognizes both the District's
unique character as the seat of the national government and the necessity
for guaranteeing unimpeded access to the federal government by corpora-
tions throughout the country. At the same time, it prevents the District
from becoming a national judicial forum.61
Second, when transactions involve consumers or merchants outside the
District, current District of Columbia choice of law rules may make the
CPPA the governing statute. The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia recently adopted a governmental interest analysis in as-
sessing choice of law problems in consumer contract disputes.62
Governmental interest analysis involves identifying the governmental poli-
cies underlying each law in conflict and deciding which state's policies
would be advanced by having its law applied in a particular situation. 63
arm jurisdiction acts. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1) (1973). MICH. COMP. LAWS §§
600.705, 600.715, 600.725,600.735, (1976). (MICH. STAT. ANN §§ 27A.705, 27A.715, 27A.725,
27A.735 (1976)).
58. Security Bank, N.A. v. Tauber, 347 F. Supp. 511 (D. D. C. 1972). In examining con-
tacts, a District of Columbia court will examine whether the party has derived substantial
revenue from the production and sale of goods and whether the goods are to be used in the
District. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. American Pecco Corp., 334 F. Supp. 522, 524 (D.D.C.
1971); accord, Gillmore v. J.S. Inskip, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 218, 282 N.Y.S.2d 127, 133 (Sup. Ct.
1967). See also Founding Church of Scientology v. Verlag, 536 F.2d 429, 432-33 (D.C. Cir.
1976). The District of Columbia Circuit has enunciated the rule that the "transacting busi-
ness" requirement for long arm jurisdiction should be given broad interpretation, limited
only by constitutional notions of due process. Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212, 1218 (D.C.
Cir. (1973).
59. Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808,
812 (D.C. 1976).
60. The "government contacts" principle was enunciated in Mueller Brass Co. v, Alexan-
der Milburn Co., 152 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
61. See, e.g., Siam Kraft Paper Co. Ltd. v. Parsons & Whittemore, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 810,
812 (D.D.C. 1975); Norair Eng'r Assocs., Inc. v. Noland Corp., 365 F. Supp. 740, 742-43
(D.D.C. 1973).
62. Swan v. American Security & Trust Co., No. 75-0961 (D.D.C. June 28, 1976) (unpub-
lished opinion). In Swan, a Virginia consumer purchased an automobile in Virginia that was
financed by a District of Columbia bank. In a suit brought after repossession of the automo-
bile, the court applied District of Columbia law by employing the significant contacts ap-
proach and analyzing the contacts in terms of their relative importance. The court concluded
that District of Columbia consumer laws were intended to protect consumers throughout the
Washington metropolitan area, and since Virginia had no strong interest in protecting a
District of Columbia creditor, District of Columbia law was applied.
63. Milhollin, The New Choice ofLaw in the District ofColumbia, 24 CATH. U.L. REV.
448, 449 (1975). Governmental interest analysis has already been utilized by the District of
Columbia courts for causes of action based on tort. See, e.g., Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa
Catholic University Law Review
III. CONCLUSION
The D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act is an innovative statute
that could, if utilized,64 easily make the District of Columbia a leader in
consumer protection. Under the statute, the director of the Office of Con-
sumer Protection serves as a public prosecutor empowered to seek relief
for individuals or classes of defrauded consumers, first through the admin-
istrative process, and then, if necessary, through the courts. The services of
the director constitute an attractive alternative for poor or lower middle
class consumers who otherwise must either retain private counsel, turn to
overburdened legal aid services, or pursue such matters unaided by coun-
sel. Assuming that the services offered by the agency are well-publicized
and commensurate funding is provided, substantial litigation is an inevita-
ble result. The likelihood of such active litigation, whether by the director
or in privately initiated actions, makes critical the issues discussed above.
Failure to effect needed clarifying amendments would leave the statute
ambiguous and confusing in material respects, thus leaving consumers,
merchants and the courts uncertain about the intended substantive law
and provisions.
Patricia Ryan Yohay
de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943
(1966).
64. In fiscal year 1977, the Office of Consumer Protection received 4,950 complaints and
resolved 2,930. It entered into formal negotiations in 20 cases and presented 14 cases to the
section of hearings, 12 of which were actually heard. The Office claims to have saved con-
sumers $159,000 for the fiscal year, and estimates that it will save consumers $300,000 in
fiscal year 1978. 1 Government of the District of Columbia, Justifications for the FY 1979
Budget, 195 (1977) (prepared for the use of the D.C. City Council).
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